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When I was invited to speak to you, I was told that the state
of Colorado was in the process of considering the subject of judicial
reform and that this subject might interest you. At first, I hestitated because it seemed to me that my home state and city had
little to offer in the way of shining examples of progress in this
field. Upon further reflection, however, it occurred to me that because of the very fact that the judicial system of our state and city
leaves so much to be desired, perhaps I could be helpful if I brought
to you specimens, as it were, from a laboratory which nurtures
much that is archaic and bewildering in the way of judicial machinery.
In New York we have some 18 separate and distinct court systems, each of them exercising separate and, in most instances, exclusive jurisdiction over different types of causes. We have over
600 judges and 2,000 magistrates and justices of the peace. Until last
year we had no central administrative office for our courts that
could even collect accurate statistics. We could not even find out
what the courts were costing us, although we are now told that the
cost of our court system exceeds $68,000,000 per year. We have a
Civil Practice Act or Code of Procedure with nearly 1600 sections
followed by over 300 Rules of Practice which take up 115 pages
of fine print. This does not include our separate Code of Practice
for our Surrogates' Court. We have a jury calendar of personal
injury cases in New York City which is about three and a half years
behind.
Most of our judges are elected by popular vote except in the
case of certain local courts.
At one time New York was a leader in reform in the administration of justice. Once our Code of Civil Procedure was taken as a
model by other states. That was a long time ago. There has been
no real change in the structure of our court system in over a
hundred years, although our way of life has considerably changed
between the horse-and-buggy days and today when over four and
a half million automobile licenses are issued each year in New York
State alone and over one hundred thirty thousand automobile accidents occur annually.
I am glad to say we are currently trying to do something about
our machinery of justice. Some three years ago a special commission, known as The Temporary Commission on the Courts, was
created by our Legislature to study the whole problem. It consists
of four members of the Legislature and six distinguished members
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of the Bar of the state. Its appointment has stirred up considerable
public interest in judicial reform, particularly among the Bar and,
through the Bar, in some of our citizens. The reforms which
are especially needed with us include the simplification of our court
structure, the establishment of a central business administration
for the courts, the simplification of our Code of Procedure, and
lastly-and perhaps most important-a change in our method of
selecting judges.
The Temporary Commission on the Courts has done a most
painstaking job and it has come forward with two major recommendations, one of which relates to the establishment of a central
administration for all the courts in our state, and the other has to
do with the simplification of our court structure and the reduction
in the number of different types of courts. As a result of these
recommendations certain legislation has been enacted and a start,
although an inadequate one, has been made in establishing centralized administration. With regard to court simplification, the Commission has made sweeping recommendations which are still being revised and reconsidered but no specific proposal, either for
legislative or constitutional reform to carry them out, has as yet
been made.
Much to the disappointment of many of us the Commission has
found no substitute for the practice which prevails in most of our
courts of electing judges by popular vote. But we are determined
not to let this issue die.
The objective of all of us is, of course, the same, namely, to
secure a capable, honest, independent judiciary made up of men
and women of intellectual and moral integrity, judicial temperament and impartial outlook-beholden to no man-or at least to as
few as possible. How are we to find such a paragon?
Let us see how we do it in New York. A ballot used in New
York City in the election of November, 1954, is typical of the ballot
with which a voter in any district in Manhattan was confronted at
that election or with which he might be confronted at almost any
election.
Twenty-six vacancies in political offices from the Governorship
down had to be filled. Twenty-six levers had to be pushed down on
the voting machine if the citizen wanted to do his part in voting to
fill these vacancies and he had to choose from some 55 candidates.
The significant fact, however, is that 20 of these vacancies which had
to be filled were vacancies in judicial offices. If the voter wanted to
do his duty he had to vote for 20 judges and to choose them from
some 35 candidates.
The fact is, of course, that most of us who entered the polling
booth on Election Day knew nothing about any of the candidates on
the entire ballot except those for Governor and perhaps three or
four others. We pulled down the other levers in most instances
because they were opposite an Eagle or a Star and many of us left
the polling booth feeling rather ashamed and humiliated because
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we had voted mostly as robots and not as free men exercising an
intelligent, informed choice. Now you may be sure that the candidates for judicial offices were among those for whom we voted
automatically.
In order to ascertain whether our personal experience in this
respect was typical, some of us got together, including our Bar
Association and Sheldon Elliott's Institute of Judicial Administration, and caused a poll of voters to be taken within a few days following Election Day. A well known organization, skilled in making
such an investigation and study, was employed for this purpose.
Three separate samplings of the voting population were made-in
New York City, in the city of Buffalo, and in Cayuga County-in
other words, the largest city, an upstate city, and an upstate semirural community. The facts found fully confirmed what we all had
assumed from our own experience.
Most of the voters could not even recall the names of most of
the men for whom they voted in the judicial contest. Not more than
1% of the voters interviewed in either of the three localities could
remember the name of the distinguished jurist for whom they had
voted and who was elected as Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals
-the highest judicial office in the state. Not one person interviewed
in the city of Buffalo could remember for whom he had voted as
Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals.
It is interesting to note that the poll which we took showed that
even in a semi-rural community where the ballot was much shorter
than in New York City, only 4% of the voters interviewed could
remember the name of any judicial candidate for whom they had
voted.
The method of electing judges directly by popular vote is, of
course, one that has great superficial appeal. It is subject to all the
familiar arguments which arouse popular emotions: Should not
the people be the choosers of those by whom they are to be judged?
Are not the people the best qualified to select the best candidates?
These and others like them are arguments which demagogic leaders
always find ready at hand. The fact is, of course, that certainly in
thickly populated communities these arguments for a popular election of judges are based on an entirely false premise. The premise
on which the successful operation of the democratic process must
always rest is that the people shall know something about the candidates for whom they are voting. Unless this is so, democracy becomes a pure mockery. Any impression that the people in such
communities choose their own judges is pure delusion and any assertion to that effect is pure fantasy. The act of choosing implies a
conscious act of the will. The voter does not exercise any real act
of choice when he pulls down the lever over the name of a man of
whom he has never even heard before he entered the polling booth
and whose name he cannot remember the day after he had voted
for him.
The ballot mentioned above is typical of the situation in our
community. Of the candidates for the 20 vacancies in judicial offices, most of the candidates were entirely unknown to most of the
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voters at the election. These candidates, chosen by the political
leaders of New York City, were in most instances unknown even
to most members of the Bar of the city. The most that the average
voter knew about the average candidate was possibly that he had
seen his photograph pasted on a billboard or in some shop window
under the party emblem. Under such conditions, any thought that
the people choose their own judges has no relation to reality.
To me this ballot is the best proof that you could find-by reductio ad absurdum--of the validity of the political philosophy
which stands for the "short ballot" and "responsible government."
This philosophy is based on what seems to me to be the self-evident
premise that only those offices should be elective which are conspicuous enough to attract public attention. If the office is one for
which the people will not take the trouble to inform themselves
with regard to the candidate, they should not be asked to make the
choice.
It is interesting to remember that the principle of the short
ballot is one that has been sponsored by leading statesmen of both
the great political parties. Woodrow Wilson headed the National
Short Ballot Association. He once stated: "I believe the short ballot
is the key to the whole problem of the restoration of popular government to this country."
In New York State in the roster of those who fought for this
principle we find such names as Charles E. Hughes, Theodore Roosevelt, Elihu Root, Alfred E. Smith, and Henry L. Stimson. I under-
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stand that the Governor of Colorado in his message to your Legislature in January, 1956, urged the adoption of the short ballot.
The logic and common sense behind the short ballot is peculiarly in point when it comes to electing judges-namely, that
voters should not be asked to vote on candidates about whom they
know nothing and as to whose qualifications they are not going to
take the trouble to inquire. The words of Charles E. Hughes, when
he was Governor of New York, in his Annual Message to the Legislature of 1910, are as apt in this situation as they were at that time.
He said:
The ends of democracy will be better attained to the extent that the attention of the voters may be focused upon
comparatively few offices, the incumbents of which can
be held strictly accountable for administration. This will
tend to promote efficiency in public office by increasing
the effectiveness of the voter and by diminishing the opportunities of political manipulators who take advantage of the
multiplicity of elective offices to perfect their schemes at
the public expense. I am in favor of as few elective offices
as may be consistent with proper accountability to the
people, and a short ballot.
The debate in New York on the principle of the short ballot
came to a focus in our Constitutional Convention of 1915 where the
short ballot was vigorously urged and sponsored by such statesmen as Elihu Root and Henry L. Stimson. Although the debate
there revolved around the short ballot with respect to executive
offices, it is striking how aptly the arguments made in favor of the
short ballot apply to the situation confronting us today in the
matter of selecting our judges.
Because the attention of the voters cannot be fixed on so many
candidates and because they are unwilling to take the trouble to
find out about them, the whole choice falls on the political leaders,
the bosses, or what used to be called the "invisible government."
No one has ever put it more effectively than Elihu Root speaking at
the New York Constitutional Convention in 1915 when he said:
Whether it be a president appointing a judge, or a
governor appointing a superintendent of public works,
whatever it may be, the officer wants to make a success,
and he wants to get the man selected upon the ground of
his ability to do the work. How is it about the boss? What
does the boss have to do? He has to urge the appointment
of a man whose appointment will consolidate his power and
preserve the organization. There has been hardly a day for
the last sixteen years when I have not seen those two
principles come in conflict. The invisible government proceeds to build up and maintain its power by a reversal of
the fundamental principle of good government, which is
that men should be selected to perform the duties of the
office, and to substitute the idea that men should be appointed to office for the preservation and enhancement and
power of the political leader. The one, the true one, looks
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upon appointment to office with a view to the service that
can be given to the public. The other, the false one, looks
upon appointment to office with a view to what can be
gotten out of it.
Judiciary offices are peculiarly fair game for the bosses. They
are often rich in patronage and the very fact that they escape close
scrutiny by the public offers a rare opportunity to the boss to run
a candidate subservient to his wishes. His wishes are usually, as
Mr. Root pointed out, the strengthening of his party organization
and his own political power rather than the true administration of
justice. If the judge becomes the boss's tool in the distribution of
patronage, it receives little public attention. The appointment by a
judge of his secretaries, receivers, guardians, and referees seldom
comes under public examination except in connection with the exposure of a public scandal.
The people of a democracy are neither able nor willing to inform themselves about a multitude of candidates. They can and will
inform themselves very thoroughly with regard to the candidates
for one or two important offices. With all the media for public information now available-radio, television, commentators and the
press-the people can learn about Ike Eisenhower or Adlai Stevenson running for President of the United States, or Stephen McNichols or Donald Brotzman running for Governor of the State of
Colorado, but the people are not interested and will not bother to
find out about Joe Doakes and Bill Jones, and maybe a dozen other
names which mean nothing to them, running for judge in a particular district.
It may be that in your state and particularly in some of the less
populated communities, conditions are different. It may be that
the judicial candidates in such areas are known to most of the
voters. The poll, which I referred to above, taken in New York
indicated, however, that even in the less thickly populated districts
the average voter took no interest in the judicial candidates.
You may say that people ought to take the trouble to inform
themselves about all candidates, including the judicial candidates.
You may say that the people ought to take the trouble to select
the kind of political leaders who truly represent their will. You
may say that the people ought to see to it that truly representative
and informed delegates to the judicial conventions are elected at
the primaries. You may say it is the people's own fault if they do
not do so.
Well, unfortunately we have to take the political facts of life
as we find them. We know that people do not take the trouble to
find out about all the candidates for whom they are asked to vote
and we know that the great majority of the people take little part
in the selection of their district leaders. There is too much else in
life to occupy them. Of all the candidates, the voters are least interested in the judicial candidates. The average voter does not
realize that he has anything but a very remote interest in the election of a good judge. The ordinary citizen very seldom comes in
direct contact with the courts. Too few of our citizens appreciate
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the wisdom of the words of George Washington which are inscribed on the portico of the New York County Courthouse-that
"The true administration of justice is the firmest pillar of good
government."
Let us see how independent and beholden to no one a judiciary
selected by popular election may be. Here again I bring you a
sample from the laboratory which we maintain in New York with
regard to judicial process. This sample is particularly interesting
because it comes from the lips of judges themselves. The judges I
refer to are the 22 judges on the City Court of the City of New York.
The City Court is second in importance only to our Supreme Court
with a civil jurisdiction up to $6,000 a year. These judges are elected
by popular vote. They receive a salary of $22,000 a year. This year
they asked the Legislature to increase their compensation to $25,000.
They submitted what I think you will agree is a most interesting
brief in support of this request. It is a frank and touching document.
They say that they need an additional $3,000 a year because they
have to go to so many hundred-dollar-a-plate dinners and because
they meet so many demands "for contributions and subscriptions to
various worthy causes in which ... former helpers are active participants." It is so significant that a few paragraphs from it deserve
quoting:
... In order for any candidate for elective office to win in a
county-wide contest, it is necessary for him to have solicited
and used active aid and cooperation of many organizations
and individuals: political, civic, religious, labor, fraternal,
social welfare, and many others. This means that after
ascending the Bench and as long as he remains on it the
City Court justice, like any other justice elected on a
county-wide basis, is met with demands for contributions
and subscriptions to various worthy causes in which his
former helpers are active participants. Frequently these are
demands which he cannot refuse and where pleading lack of
moriey is not accepted as a satisfactory excuse.
One of the most conspicuous examples of this is the
well-known hundred-dollar-a-plate dinner, many of which
occur in each year.
In one respect the need of the City Court justices to
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cooperate with former helpers is greater than that of the
other State-court jurists who are elected by the majority
votes of a county. The fact that a City Court justice may
be contesting at some future date for a place on one of these
other state courts compels him to answer many requests
which otherwise he could ignore.
This statement is almost naive in its frankness. But the fact
that his plight can be so frankly stated indicates that it is accepted
as a matter of course that a judge, after he ascends the bench, must
repay in tangible form for support which helped him get there
and that he must, while still on the bench, enlist by similar means
support for the future, having an eye to promotion to higher things.
If such is the pressure for money upon these judges, what must
it be for favors of other kinds? Surely this pressure at times must
seem intolerable. If there is one thing vital to sound government it
is an independent judiciary beholden to no man and administering
justice without fear or favor. A system which results in electing
men to the bench encumbered with a plethora of political obligations is destructive of first principles. To our shame these political
obligations have on occasion been found to run even in the direction
of leaders of the underworld. When a candidate, who has just been
nominated for an important judicial office, is recorded in an official
wiretap as saying to a leading gangster: "I want to assure you of
my loyalty for all you have done--it's undying", is it any wonder
that the people's confidence in the courts is shaken?
Is it any wonder that so many clients whose cases are about to
come to court believe, whether rightly or wrongly, that they will
receive favorable treatment only if they hire a lawyer who happens
to stand well politically with the judge? The mere fact that this
view is widely held, however unwarranted, shakes the public's confidence in our courts. No democracy can survive if the people lose
their respect for the law. Respect for the law cannot exist without
respect for the courts which administer the law.
The frankness with which these judges point to their impulse
to campaign for higher judicial office while on the bench is another interesting commentary on our system. It is interesting to
contrast this, for example, to the English system. Let me quote
from Lord Justice Denning of the English High Court of Appeal,
who came to visit us last summer as a guest of the American Bar
Association. He said in one of his addresses:
...

We have no system of promotion of judges in Eng-

land. Once a man becomes a judge, he has nothing to gain
from further promotion and does not seek it. The judges of
the Supreme Court are all paid the same, no matter whether
they sit to try cases at first instance or whether they sit in
the Court of Appeal.... A man who accepts the office of a

judge in England must reckon that he will stay in that
position always. He has taken it on as his life work and
must stand by it. This is the same whether he is a High
Court judge or a County Court judge or a stipendiary magistrate. Each normally stays where he is throughout his
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judicial career. The reason is that we think that the decisions of a judge should not be influenced by the hope of
promotion.
The alternative to the selection of judges by popular election is,
of course, to put the responsibility for their selection upon some officer elected by the people, whose office is sufficently conspicuous
to have enlisted the people's interest in his candidacy and whose
qualities the people have taken the trouble to appraise.
The appointive system of selecting judges is not a new and untried method. Let us not forget that the founders of our republic,
in drafting the Constitution of the United States, which has served
us well for all these generations, adopted the principle of the short
ballot, responsible government and an appointed judiciary. The
people vote for the President and Vice-President of the United
States. They do not vote for the Secretary of State, the AttorneyGeneral, the Secretary of Defense or any other member of the
Cabinet. The responsibility for the selection of his team is left to
the President, a candidate about whom the people are able to inform themselves. The selection of the Supreme Court of the United
States and all members of the Federal judiciary is also left to the
President.
The success with which the appointive federal judiciary system
has in general operated speaks well for the wisdom of our forefathers who adopted it. It is also a satisfactory answer to anyone
who might say that it contravenes the principle of the separation
of powers of the executive and judiciary. Surely no one was more
jealous of the principle of the separation of powers of these departments of government than the framers of the Constitution of the
United States, yet they provided for the appointment of the Federal
judges by the Chief Executive with the advice and consent of the
Senate.
The appointive system prevails in one form or another and in
respect to certain courts in seven states of the Union, namely, Connecticut, Delaware, New Jersey, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri
and New Hampshire. It prevails in a certain form in California.
In England judges are appointed. In fact, selection of judges by
popular vote is unknown, not only in any other English speaking
common law country, but elsewhere except in Soviet Russia and its
satellites.
I am interested to know that you in Colorado are considering
a proposed plan for the selection of judges along the lines of the
American Bar Association plan. It seems to me that a plan of this
nature bids fair to result in the selection of judges removed as far
from political considerations as any plan that has as yet been devised. Of course it is too much to expect that political affiliations
can be made never to play any part in a judge's selection, whatever
method be adopted. But surely it is not too much to expect that
political consideration shall be a minor consideration and that some
system may be found whereby qualifications for the job shall play
the really important part.
In 1945, a citizens committee which included most of the lead-
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ing lawyers in the City of New York was formed and adopted a
similar plan and actively sponsored it. In December, 1952, The Association of the Bar of the City of New York in open meeting approved the report of one of its committees which recommended a
plan of this nature for our district. A Special Committee on the
Administration of Justice approved of the same plan in November,
1955, and presented it to The Temporary Commission on the Courts.
But reform in this direction still meets determined opposition and
our plans have not yet come to fruition.
One of the things which we have learned in New York is that
the influence of the Bar alone is not sufficient to secure the enactment of the necessary legislation or constitutional amendment to
bring about reform. This seems curious in view of the fact that such
a large percentage of our legislators are lawyers. In order to move
them to act, however, it is essential to arouse public opinion generally. The conspicuous success that was had in New Jersey in court
reform was only brought about by an aroused citizenry outside of
the legal profession. This is not easy to accomplish because, as I
have said, the average citizen never comes into direct contact with
the courts and, therefore, only vaguely senses the underlying importance of a sound judiciary to his well being.
It is the members of the Bar who see the defects in our creaking
machinery but the trick is how to get them cured. There are so
many to whose best interest it is to keep things as they, are and this
includes elected judges whose influence politically is certainly not
negligible. Lawyers, moreover, have an understandable reluctance
not to offend judges who sit on the bench by suggesting that there
is anything wrong with our method of selection.
Appreciating these facts, we have in New York within the last
year or so organized a citizens committee known as the Committee
for Modern Courts. This committee includes among its membership
representatives of many of the leading organizations in the state
including women's organizations, labor organizations, chambers of
commerce, and the like. It has hardly had time to get started but
I believe its influence has already been felt in certain directions and
in connection with certain reforms.
But it is to members of our profession that we must look to
spark any substantial movement for reform in the administration
of justice. Only we lawyers are in a position fully to detect the
defects in our judicial machinery or fully to appreciate their importance. We must learn the art of gathering behind our banners the
throng of all right-minded peop]e in all walks of life. But it will
always be for the members of our profession in this area of statesmanship to head the procession and to carry the torch.
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